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Note
Call For Reform: Analyzing Trips Through
European Seizure Of Generic Medication
Justin Erickson ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has long been a subject of
controversy in international patent law. In the past,
medications were subject to strict patent protection from
domestic laws but little international protection. However, the
dramatic increase in prevalence of communicable diseases led
to a sharp increase in demand from developing countries that
had not developed their own pharmaceutical industries.
Because of this demand, there was a substantial increase in the
trade of pharmaceuticals. Such an increase led to the violation
of domestic patents of many countries, which prompted the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to implement international
patent protection standards through the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).
These standards, though, have been the subject of much
criticism that has manifested itself through the drastic actions
many countries are taking to protect their domestic industry.
One such example is the seizing of ships with generic
medications. Countries seizing the medication claim protection
under international agreements. At the same time, countries
whose domestically produced medication has been seized claim
that such seizures are in violation of international agreements.
This ambiguity is costly and requires resolution.
This note seeks to understand the conflict in TRIPS
Justin Erickson is a J.D. Candidate (2013) at the University of Minnesota
and holds a B.A. from Wartburg College. This note would not have been
possible without the support of his wife, Molly Erickson and his parents, Rick
and Cindy Erickson. Special thanks also goes to the staff of the Minnesota
Journal of International Law, in particular Julia Norsetter, Matt Stearns, and
Charles Sutton, for their efforts on this note.
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through recent European Union (E.U.) seizures of Brazilian
and Indian medications. Part II describes the implementation
of TRIPS and provides the factual background of the conflict
over drug seizures. Part III analyzes the specific complaints
made by Brazil and India to the WTO, and the resulting
settlement between the E.U. and India. Then, the analysis
looks to the resolution of the India and E.U. case to understand
how TRIPS may be clarified in the future.
The purpose of this note will be two-fold. First, there will
be an analysis of the cause of this conflict: the inherent
flexibilities found within TRIPS. This will consist of a study of
two primary parts of TRIPS: the extent countries can use
TRIPS as the basis for production of generic medications in the
violation of patents, and the measures countries can take to
enforce their own domestic laws. The analysis of this second
issue will specifically examine whether the E.U. had the
authority to seize the generic medication under TRIPS. Such an
analysis demonstrates the need for further clarification of the
scope of this agreement.
The second part of this note will examine the Indian
settlement to determine whether either of these issues has
been solved. Such an analysis will demonstrate that the recent
litigation has helped to clarify enforcement aspects of TRIPS
while leaving production questions unanswered. This will set
the stage for discussion about how the settlements’ provisions
will more broadly impact the rest of the international
community.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIPS
Adopted during the Uruguay Round, TRIPS was created in
response to concerns over international patent protection and
1
came into effect in 1995. The growth of global trade led to
2
concerns over inconsistencies in patent laws. Loose patent
protection created tensions in trade negotiations and in overall
1. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2012) [hereinafter Overview].
2. See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Intellectual property: protection and
enforcement] (emphasizing the various forms of intellectual property rights
protections and enforcement measures enacted by WTO Members).
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economic relationships. WTO Members negotiated TRIPS to
facilitate innovation and ensure protection for domestic
suppliers through establishing a minimum level of patent
4
protection.
5
TRIPS covers three basic areas. First, TRIPS required
that Members adhere to substantive obligations of previously
signed treaties, which had laid out international patent
6
protection standards, and provided a minimum standard.
Second, Members were required to develop domestic remedies
and enforcement procedures that would allow a patent-holder
7
to pursue a claim if necessary. Members were to develop
criminal procedures and border protection remedies to
8
prosecute those found in violation of patent agreements. Third,
the agreement permitted utilization of the WTO’s dispute
settlement procedures within the Dispute Settlement
9
Understanding.
The adoption of TRIPS did not come without significant
10
opposition, particularly from developing countries. Fewer
than 20 developing countries were involved in the negotiations,
a rather unrepresentative group, given that as of 2009 there
11
were 106 developing countries bound by the treaty. Indeed,
many developing countries had a poor understanding of the
12
scope and implications of signing on. Furthermore, through
3. See id.
4. See Overview, supra note 1 (stating that TRIPS is a minimum
standards agreement, meaning that Members are required to meet the
standards of the agreement but are free to make provisions more extensive for
increased intellectual property protection if they so desire).
5. See id.
6. See id. (noting that TRIPS required that Members comply, with minor
exceptions, with the most recent versions of the Paris Convention for
Production of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, and the World Intellectual Property
Organization).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, App. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
10. See Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck, Developing Countries in the Global IP
System Before TRIPS: The Political Context for the TRIPS Negotiations, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
UNDER WTO RULES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE WTO VOLUME I, 22, 42–
43 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (stating that many developing countries
believed TRIPS was not an ideal agreement).
11. Id. at 46.
12. Id.
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TRIPS, developing countries agreed to increased standards for
IP protection, while receiving few or no concessions from
developed countries to ensure the availability of necessary
13
goods, such as essential medicines. Indeed, one commentator
suggested that TRIPS will force developing countries to
undertake significant legal and economic reforms consistent
14
with free market principles, requiring developing countries to
adopt policies that favored the interests of developed countries.
Of much greater importance to developing countries was the
need to develop domestic infrastructures in education, and
other areas of society, which would assist in implementing and
15
sustaining an intellectual property regime.
Further,
developing countries have unique cultural norms which would
16
be “particularly vulnerable to infringement.” Despite these
differences, developing countries signed on to TRIPS to ensure
access to new technology and to take advantage of opportunity
17
to design legislation in conjunction with their own interests.
Thus, it came as no surprise that conflict quickly arose
over the implementation of TRIPS. This conflict was
18
particularly heated in the area of public health. The rise and
spread of diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria
caused many countries to look for a manner in which they could
protect access to medications, whether through compulsory
patent licenses, allowing the production of generic forms of
19
medication, or by declaring a national health emergency. This
led other countries, particularly those with developed
pharmaceutical industries, to argue that TRIPS protected their
13. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 3
(2000). See also Ruth L. Gana, Prospects For Developing Countries Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 739–740 (1996) (arguing
that the TRIPS Agreement put heavy IP protection burdens on developing
countries, which were not as active in negotiations as developed countries, and
provided them little benefit in return).
14. See Gana, supra note 13, at 735.
15. Id. at 744.
16. Id. at 767.
17. See CORREA, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that developing countries will
be able to use the TRIPS obligations to design domestic laws focused on
internal policies); Gana, supra note 13, at 373 (arguing that the TRIPS
agreement would help developing countries to utilize international technology
flows).
18. See The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
HEALTH
ORG.,
Health,
WORLD
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/index.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter World Health].
19. See id.
AND
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own domestic patents. Generic medication producers and
suppliers in poor countries justified their production by arguing
that TRIPS allows for justified infringement of patents for the
21
purpose of protecting public health.
The dispute over generic medication production grew to the
point that most Members felt an international solution was
22
needed. This solution came in 2001, at the WTO Ministerial
23
Conference in Doha. The WTO members adopted a ministerial
declaration, known as the Doha Declaration, which stated that
TRIPS should be interpreted “in a manner supportive of public
24
health . . . .” The Doha Declaration reaffirmed several terms of
TRIPS as important measures in protecting public health.
Chief among these was the ability to grant compulsory licenses,
25
a substantial tool for generic pharmaceutical producers.
Compulsory licensing gives government bodies the broad
authority to “license the use of a patented invention to a third
party or government agency without the consent of the patent26
holder.” While there are some restrictions on compulsory
licensing, these restrictions are fairly flexible and can be
27
waived at the country’s choosing. Additionally, the Doha
Declaration reaffirmed a country’s freedom to designate which
public health emergencies justified an infringement of the
28
patent.
The Doha Declaration also provided a boost to least20. Cf. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 2.
21. Specifically, generic producing countries argued that TRIPS provided
flexibility, pointing to provisions which allowed countries to grant licensing
rights in order to better protect the general public, particularly during a public
health crisis. The degree of flexibility within TRIPS remains unclear. See id.
22. See generally World Health, supra note 18 (“In 2001, WTO Members
adopted a special Ministerial Declaration at the WTO Ministerial Conference
in Doha to clarify ambiguities between the need for governments to apply the
principles of public health and the terms of [TRIPS].”).
23. See id.
24. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 748 (2002), ¶ 17 [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
25. See World Health, supra note 18.
26. Id.
27. See id. Article 31 of TRIPS laid out several conditions that countries
were required to fulfill before issuing a compulsory license, such as
demonstrating unsuccessful negotiations with the patent owner and payment
to the patent owner. The country could also waive these requirements by
claiming a public health emergency. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
28. See World Health, supra note 18.
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developed countries (“LDC”) by extending the amount of time
29
they had to implement domestic patent protections. Initially,
TRIPS called for each country to implement legislation that
30
would ensure other country’s patents were protected by 2006.
The Doha Declaration extended this deadline for LDCs to
31
2016. This extension specifically targeted public health
related patents, providing additional relief to LDCs that had
32
not been able to enact the proper regulatory regimes. The
adoption of the Doha Declaration gave generic medication
producers additional flexibility to address public health
concerns.
Perhaps more importantly, the Doha Declaration was
enhanced by a General Council decision made in August 2003,
which laid out a process to ensure the availability of
33
medications to LDCs. This decision created a process by which
LDCs could import generic medications from other countries
under TRIPS. The Doha Declaration recognized that some
countries were unable to develop their own medications, and so
34
it directed Members to find a solution to this problem. The
General Council decision solved this issue by holding that a
country could use compulsory licensing solely for exporting to
LDCs if it notified the WTO and the medications were
35
produced for a country unable to produce them on their own.
Despite the clarity the Doha Declaration brought to TRIPS
for issues of public health, many problems still remained. First,
many countries claim TRIPS is still not an adequate solution to
36
public health issues. At the same time, many in the
pharmaceutical industry argue that the Doha Declaration
29. See id. (recognizing that immediate adoption of TRIPS ran counter to
the public health concerns of many LDCs).
30. Cf. World Health, supra note 18.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council,
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2003), ¶ 6
[hereinafter General Council Decision]. Paragraph 6 of this decision instructed
WTO Members to create a mechanism for LDCs to gain access to medications.
34. Id.
35. Id. ¶ 2.
36. See, Peter Hildpold, WTO Laws and Human Rights: Bringing
Together Two Autopoietic Orders, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323, 361–62 (2011).
The Doha Declaration was criticized for improving only the access to lifesaving treatments and medications. Many felt such limited access excluded
important health concerns. Furthermore, the requirement of payment to the
patent holder was often times impossible as many countries simply did not
have the money.
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provided too much flexibility to generic manufacturers. Such
38
flexibility, they suggest, stifles innovation and creativity. The
pharmaceutical companies argue that many countries took
advantage of the Doha Declaration, using the authority it
granted individual countries to operate with only their own
39
interests in mind, and that many countries who claim public
health as a rationale for compulsory licensing are actually able
40
to afford medication. As a result of these conflicts, Members
are able, and have threatened, to bring legal action through
41
WTO dispute resolution procedures.
B. THE SEIZURE OF GENERIC MEDICATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT
LITIGATION
Given the tension over TRIPS and the Doha Declaration, it
was only a matter of time before conflicts elevated beyond
diplomatic disagreements. Such was the case with the
shipment of generic medications through the E.U. by India and
Brazil. At least twenty times, medicines shipped from India
and bound for Latin America were stopped and seized by the
42
E.U.
These seizures sparked complaints from many
developing countries, who claimed that the drug seizures
43
violated international law.
The tension over the seizure of generic medication finally
reached a tipping point in May 2010. E.U. officials, operating
through the Netherlands, stopped and seized a shipment of
generic medication bound for Brazil (and eventually other
44
Latin American countries). These medications were produced
37. See, Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, and the Doha “Solution”,
3 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 47, 66 (2002).
38. See id. (alluding to the fact that the Doha Declaration undermines the
policy goals of TRIPS, as pharmaceutical companies argue that the ability to
claim a “health emergency” with no penalty for false statements, forces
additional costs to be borne by the original manufacturer).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., id. at 66–67. The G-8 had committed new economic aid to
help developing countries fight disease. Such aid, they argued, should be
partially used to remunerate the pharmaceutical industry under Article 31 of
the TRIPS agreement. Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry has argued
the remuneration is only effective if research and development costs are taken
into consideration.
41. See generally Overview, supra note 1 (outlining the use of the WTO’s
dispute resolution system in conflicts regarding TRIPS).
42. See John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU Trade
ST.
J.,
Aug.
6,
2009,
Complaint,
WALL.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124949598103308449.html
43. See id.
44. See India, Brazil Raise Dispute over EU Drug Seizures, THIRD WORLD
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in India and were stopped in the Netherlands in transit when
45
Dutch customs officials seized the cargo.
C. INDIA AND BRAZIL FILE SUIT IN THE WTO
Unlike previous seizures, India and Brazil moved quickly
to file legal action, lodging a complaint with the WTO Dispute
46
Settlement Body. The WTO opened consultations, the first
47
step in its dispute settlement process.
The Brazilian
government asserted that the E.U. was in violation of
48
international law. India, while somewhat more measured in
its public declarations, wanted assurance that its shipments
49
would no longer be affected by E.U. customs officers.
Brazil was one of the leaders in the use of generic
medications to combat health emergencies, and India was a
major international player in the manufacture and export of
50
generic drugs. As such, both used TRIPS to great effect.
Ironically, many Indian parliamentarians had raised concerns
51
about TRIPS shortly after its adoption. Many Indian human
rights activists believed that TRIPS, if implemented
imprudently, would provide the pharmaceutical industry with
52
too much protection. Without domestic safeguards they
believed TRIPS could cause dramatic increases in the cost of
53
medications.
NETWORK
(May
17,
2010),
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100509.htm.
45. See id.
46. See id. Indian Ambassador Ujal Singh Bhatia noted the WTO
complaint was filed over two primary concerns. First, he expressed that he
believed the EU was acting at the request of their patent holders. Second, he
articulated that the drugs were legally produced under WTO rules and that
the EU had failed to respond to requests for information on the seizure.
47. See id.
48. See id. Ambassador Roberto Azevedo of Brazil said these seizures "are
a clear violation of WTO disciplines on the freedom of transit, which is one of
the cornerstones of the multilateral trading system. This is even clearer . . .
when there is no doubt on the lack of patent protection for the goods either in
the exporting country or in the importing country." Id.
49. See India, Brazil Raise Dispute Over EU Drug Seizures, supra note 44.
50. Mario Osava, Brazil Imports Generic AIDS Drugs from India, China,
PRESS
SERVICE
(Sept.
5,
2003),
INTER
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=19997.
51. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of
TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV.
1571, 1587 (2009).
52. MSF, a humanitarian group, was concerned was that TRIPS
implementation would grant too much international protection to new uses for
known substances. Id. at 1586–87.
53. Many humanitarian groups protested against an ordinance passed by
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India sought to take advantage of the Doha Declaration,
arguing that because its constitution guaranteed a right to
health, it was required to interpret international agreements in
54
a manner that favored supply of medication. To do this, India
implemented a domestic patent enforcement system which set
55
very high standards for what could be considered patentable.
Such a patent system likely played a large role in allowing
India to become an international leader in the development and
exportation of generic medications because it led to increased
competition in the pharmaceutical market. Brazil also took
advantage of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration to develop a
strong generic market. While Brazil did not have the
constitutional requirement of health, it was the primary
conduit for generic medications en route to most Latin
56
American countries. In order to meet these demands, Brazil
took advantage of compulsory licensing, using it to respond to a
57
variety of public health emergencies. Furthermore, Brazil
used the threat of compulsory licensing to negotiate favorable
deals with the pharmaceutical industry, providing them access
to patented medication at prices that were far below market
58
value.
Litigation quickly proceeded against the E.U., with Brazil
and India initiating a trade dispute in May of 2010. Brazil and
India argued that the E.U.’s actions violated several Articles of
both TRIPS and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
59
(“GATT”). First, India cited two different provisions of TRIPS.
the Indian parliament which brought it into compliance with TRIPS. They
argued the ordinance should have included domestic limitations on India’s
obligations to respect patentability on known substances. Id. at 1586–87.
54. Timothy Bazzle, Note, Pharmacy of the Developing World: Reconciling
Intellectual Property Rights in India with the Right to Health: TRIPS, India’s
Patent System and Essential Medicines, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 785, 799 (2011).
55. Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 1589. India created two requirements to
determine whether a given item was deserving of a patent. First, the subject
matter of the item had to be unique. This meant that if a medication was
made of already known substances, it could not be patented unless it enhanced
efficacy. Id. at 1590–1593. Second, India set an extremely high level for the
“inventive step” requirement of patents. It required the inventive step to
represent a technical advance or have economic significance; an “unusual, and
perhaps unique” inventive step provision. Id. at 1594.
56. Osava, supra note 50.
57. Id.; Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as
Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 387–88 (2011).
These public health emergencies were declared under Brazilian standards.
58. Harris, supra note 57, at 387–88.
59. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a
Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, ¶¶ 1–5, WT/DS408/1 (May
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It claimed authority to produce the medication under Article 4
of the Paris Convention and the General Council Decision of
60
2003 on the implementation of the Doha Declaration. Second,
India noted that the E.U.’s seizure was in violation of GATT
Article V (it interfered with the free transit of goods) and
Article X (it constituted non-uniform administration of trade
61
practices and regulations).
India also argued that the E.U.
seizures were made in violations of Articles 7, 8, 28, 41, and 42
62
of TRIPS. Brazil, in turn, filed a more extensive complaint. In
addition to the violations India cited, Brazil charged that the
E.U. seizure was in violation of Article XVI of the GATT and
63
Articles 49–55, 58, and 59 of TRIPS.
Brazil and India were primarily concerned with three
issues arising from the seizures. First, Brazil and India argued
that they had acted in full compliance with TRIPS, but that the
E.U. measures were not administered in a uniform manner,
despite the requirement contained in Article X of the GATT
that measures be administered in a “uniform, impartial and
64
reasonable manner.” India argued that the E.U. measures
were unreasonable because they involved enforcing strict
patent control procedures without regard to the flexibilities
65
TRIPS provided to generic producers. Second, Brazil and
India wanted to ensure protection of their thriving generic
66
market. Third, they claimed that the E.U. was disregarding
19, 2010); Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member
State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, at 4, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010).
60. Id. ¶ 3.India argued that it was within its rights to produce and ship
the drugs under the public health exceptions found in the TRIPS agreement.
61. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Article V allowed for the free transit of goods (subject to
reasonable customs examinations), while Article X required member states to
disclose customs regulations and restrictions on imports and exports. India
charged that the EU failed to provide information about the rationale for the
seizures. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
62. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶¶ 1, 3–5.
63. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59 Brazil was much
more aggressive than India, seeking to apply this ruling beyond generic
medication. C.f. Bruce Lehr, EU-India Settle WTO Drug Trade Dispute, THE
BIG
RED
BIOTECH
BLOG
(Dec.
13,
2010,
10:33
AM),
http://thebigredbiotechblog.typepad.com/the-big-red-biotech-blog/2010/12/euindia-settle-wto-drug-trade-dispute.html/ (describing how quickly the EUIndia dispute was resolved).
64. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
65. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.
66. Id. ¶ 5 (claiming Article 31 of TRIPS authorized the production of
exportation of generic medications through compulsory licensing). The
pharmaceutical industry in India was valued at over $12 billion in 2009 and is
projected to grow to $55 billion by 2020, and generic pharmaceuticals
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WTO regulations and acting only on behalf of patent holders.
While the E.U. never officially answered the Request for
Consultations, Ambassador Eckart Guth had previously made
statements to the WTO justifying the drug seizures.
Ambassador Guth cited TRIPS Article 51, which gave it
authority to suspend cargo shipments if they were in violation
68
of international patent laws.
Ambassador Guth also
emphasized that the drugs were returned to India after
investigation, the seizure was temporary, and regardless of
whether the cargo was produced properly, international law
allowed for temporary seizures while customs officials checked
69
the origin of the cargo. E.U. officials argued that the cargo
was only being checked to ensure that it would not be diverted
70
and sold into E.U. ports in violation of domestic patent law.
With the case having been filed, parties began preparing
for consultations. Five countries (Canada, China, Turkey,
Japan, and Ecuador) joined the litigation, demonstrating the
importance of the issue at hand: interpretation of the
71
contentious TRIPS agreement and subsequent declarations.
D. RESOLUTION WITH INDIA; CONTINUED LITIGATION IN BRAZIL
The E.U. was particularly interested in avoiding protracted
litigation and therefore sought to settle the claims with each
country. There was some speculation that the E.U.’s interest in
settlement was in part motivated by a free trade agreement it
72
was negotiating with India. Regardless, the E.U. quickly
produced by India constitute nearly twenty percent of global supplies.
Pharmaceuticals, INDIA BRAND EQUITY FOUND., http://www.ibef.org/
industry/pharmaceuticals.aspx (last updated Feb., 2012).
67. See id. ¶¶ 1–5 (discussing the list of GATT and TRIPS articles
violated). See also India, Brazil Raise Dispute over EU Drug Seizures, supra
note 44 (arguing the E.U. seized the medications under pressure from the
pharmaceutical industry.
68. Eckart Guth, Ambassador of EU to WTO, EC Intervention (WTO
General Council, (Feb. 2009) available at http://www.ipwatch.org/files/WTO_GENERAL_COUNCIL.doc
69. Id.
70. Id. See also Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, 13 INTELL.
PROP.
PROGRAMME
4
(Feb.
4,
2009),
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/39772/.
71. Prashant Reddy, China, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Ecuador Seek to
Join Consultations in the Indo-E.U. Trade Dispute over Seizure of ‘In-transit’
IP
(July
22,
2010,
3:58
PM),
Generic
Drugs,
SPICY
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/07/china-canada-japan-turkey-ecuadorseek.html.
72. See e.g., Lehr, supra note 63. See also Matthias Williams, India, EU
Heal Drug Seizures Dispute with Interim Settlement, REUTERS, JULY, 28, 2011,
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entered into settlement talks with India.
These talks eventually bore fruit, and a settlement was
73
reached in October 2010. The E.U. agreed to undergo
substantial reforms to its customs and patent enforcement
74
procedures. In return for these changes, India suspended its
pursuit of the claim, though India retained the right to revive it
should the E.U. fail to make satisfactory reforms to its customs
75
regulations. Despite the Indian settlement, there was no
progress made in the Brazilian case. There has been little
discussion about this, but the lack of a free trade agreement
negotiation with Brazil likely put less pressure on the E.U. to
76
reach an immediate settlement.
III. ANALYSIS
This analysis seeks to understand the ways in which
TRIPS and the Doha Declaration are ambiguous and the ways
in which the Indian settlement clarified this ambiguity. First,
we turn to Article 1.1 of TRIPS, cited by Brazil in its request
77
for consultations. Article 1.1 states that countries may
“determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and
78
practice.” The discretion allowed in Article 1.1 providing
countries flexibility while implementing generic production
resulted in considerable tension. Brazil used the flexibility to
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/india-eu-drugsidUSL3E7IS4WW20110728 (discussing how generic medications have become
a hot button issue between India and the E.U. as they conclude a free trade
agreement); EU, India Resolve Spat Over Generic Drug Settlements, But FTA
to Wait Until 2011 INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/98989/htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012) (calling the drug seizure dispute “an irritant” in broader free
trade negotiations).
73. George Mathew, India, EU Settle Generic Drug Seizure Issue, THE
INDIAN
EXPRESS
(Oct.
8,
2010,
3:17
AM),
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-eu-settle-generic-drug-seizureissue/694259/1.
74. Id.
75. Press Release, Gov’t of India, India EU Reach an Understanding on
Issue of Seizure of Indian Generic Drugs in Transit (July 28, 2011), available
at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73554.
76. However, Mercorsur and the European Union have recently reentered
negotiations over a free trade agreement. See Mercosur, EUROPEAN COMM.
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/regions/mercosur/htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). Brazil may have
accepted the terms of India’s settlement as adequate as well.
77. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59.
78. TRIPS, supra note 27.
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aggressively implement compulsory licensing to bolster its
79
generic pharmaceutical sector. At the same time, the E.U.
used this discretion to implement an aggressive customs
system that led to extensive seizure of medications. The broad
discretion allowed in Article 1.1 is essentially the root of the
controversy, while the individualized implementations of
TRIPS by each country amplify its ambiguity and demonstrate
80
its inherent flaws.
A. DID INDIA AND BRAZIL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND
TRANSFER THE GOODS?
Likely a chief concern for the E.U. was that the aggressive
generic production of India and Brazil went beyond the goals
and purposes of TRIPS and that India used TRIPS to create a
lucrative generic market. The dispute between the E.U. and
India and Brazil thus embodied a more fundamental concern:
the interpretation of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration. Do
countries such as India and Brazil have the right to license,
produce, and export generic medications under TRIPS? An
analysis of the arguments presented demonstrates that TRIPS
fails to definitively answer this question. Such ambiguity leads
to enforcement problems.
India first claimed authority to produce the medication
based on a reading of Article 28, in combination with Article 2,
Article 4bis of the 1967 Paris Convention, and the Decision of
the General Council of August 30, 2003 on the Implementation
81
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. Article 28, as
discussed above, defines the rights provided to a patent holder
82
and essentially gives the holder sole use of production. Article
2 reaffirms the commitments to previously negotiated
83
agreements involving intellectual property. These Articles
84
provide an international standard for patent protection.
As described in India’s request for consultations, India
combines these TRIPS rights with the Paris Convention and
Doha to assert a broad authority to produce generic medication.
79. Harris, supra note 57, at 387–88.
80. For reference, the other Articles used by India and Brazil were 2, 7, 8,
28, 31, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, and 59. Request for Consultations
by India, supra note 59; Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59.
81. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 3.
82. TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 28.
83. Id. at art. 2.
84. See Overview, supra note 1 (describing these articles as the standards
of patent protection under TRIPS).
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First, Article 4bis of the Paris Convention ensures the right of
85
countries to independently grant their own patents. Here,
India uses the Article as a basis for India’s own production of
generic drugs, indicating that a drug manufacturer must have
been granted a patent by India in order to receive protection
from the Indian government, even if the medication produced
86
violates other countries’ patents.
India then uses the Doha Declaration to expand its
87
authority to produce medication under the Paris Convention.
India does this by relying on Paragraph 6(i) of the Decision of
the General Counsel of August 30, 2003 on the implementation
88
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. Paragraph 6(i)
provides a waiver under Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which had
originally allowed countries to violate a patent only if the
89
product produced was to be used for its domestic population.
Under Paragraph 6(i), countries can export pharmaceutical
products to developing countries, provided that the importing
country makes the exporting country aware of the need for such
medication and demonstrates that it does not have the capacity
90
to produce the drug on its own.
India combines these documents to broadly define its right
to produce generic medication under TRIPS. Essentially, India
argues that any pharmaceutical drug that originated from
India could not be interfered with, provided it was
manufactured and exported under the requirements of the
Doha Declaration as interpreted in the General Council
91
decision. India argues that “the rights conferred on the owner
of a patent cannot be extended to interfere with the freedom of
85. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4bis, as
last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 (“Patents applied for in the various countries of the
Union by nationals of countries of the Union shall be independent of patents
obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether members of the
Union or not.”).
86. See Request for Consultations by India, supra note 60, ¶ 3.
87. Id. Comparatively, the Paris Convention dealt more with the rights of
countries to produce goods independent of other countries’ laws.
88. Id As discussed previously, this decision was meant to provide
guidance on providing pharmaceutical products to developing countries which
were unable to develop their own pharmaceutical industry.
89. See Decision of the General Council, supra note 33. Originally, India’s
actions would have violated Article 31 because most of its generic medications
were exported. TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 31.
90. Least developing countries do not need to demonstrate an inability to
produce the medication. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 2.
91. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 3.
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transit of generic drugs lawfully manufactured within, and
92
exported from, India.”
The broad reach of India’s
interpretation becomes even more evident when examining the
nature of specific E.U. drug seizures. For example, one seizure
93
targeted generic anti-hypertensive drugs. Hypertension, more
commonly known as high blood pressure, is a very common
94
affliction. The Doha Declaration was primarily implemented
as a solution to high-profile public health emergencies, with the
declaration specifically listing HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
95
malaria as examples. India’s production of hypertension
medication exceeds the intended limits of the Doha Declaration
and TRIPS. Hypertension, while serious, has not risen to the
96
level of a public health crisis on the scale of HIV/AIDS. Thus,
India’s production of hypertension medication demonstrates
that India justifies the breaking of patents for many drugs far
beyond the intended scope of the Doha Declaration, though, as
will be discussed below, India can argue that the list of diseases
in Doha is simply a non-exhaustive starting point. Essentially,
India has ensured itself a lucrative generic industry, valid
under TRIPS provided it serves developing countries.
This is not to say that India’s production of such
medication is necessarily unjustified. Indeed, high blood
pressure is a serious affliction that can lead to severe medical
97
problems. In fact, India may argue that the list of diseases in
the Doha Declaration is not a closed list. Moreover, the Doha
Declaration was implemented to confirm “that the [TRIPS] can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and,

92. Id.
93. Tim Stirrup & Katherine Hebditch, EU dispute with India and Brazil
up Stakes in Generics Saga, BALDWIN INTELL. PROP. (July 21, 2010),
http://www.baldwins.com/eu-dispute-with-india-and-brazil-ups-stakes-ingenerics-saga/.
94. High blood pressure (hypertension), MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 22, 2011)
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/high-blood-pressure/DS00100. 50 million
people in the United States alone suffer from hypertension, which is nearly
thirty percent of the population. Vincent R. Moloney, High Blood Pressure:
Can You Prevent It? Lower It?, BLOODPRESSURE-DRS-PRACTICAL-GUIDE.COM,
http://www.bloodpressure-drs-practical-guide.com/highbloodpressure.html.
95. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4–6; See World Health, supra
note 18 (arguing that widespread epidemics were the driving force behind the
Doha Declaration).
96. C.f. Junaid Subhan, Scrutinized: The TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 9 MCGILL J. OF MED., 152, 156 (2006) (arguing that high cholesterol
does not rise to the level of AIDS or other communicable diseases).
97. See High blood pressure (hypertension), supra note 94.
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in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” Such a
broad statement lends considerable support to India’s claim.
First, public health can be defined very inclusively.
Merriam Webster defines public health as “the art and science
dealing with the protection and improvement of community
health by organized community effort and including preventive
99
medicine and sanitary and social science.” Such a definition
clearly is not limited to life-threatening illnesses. Certainly the
treatment of hypertension can be included here, both in terms
of community health and preventative medicine. Second, the
last statement, “to promote access to medicines for all” is
persuasive as well. Because India could argue that it was
trying to provide medicine to developing countries, it can claim
that it is doing nothing more than fulfilling the purpose of the
Doha Declaration. It is ensuring that developing countries have
access to a supply of medicine through generic production, a
need recognized in paragraph 6i of the 2003 General Council
100
decision.
Many countries, however, claim that the Doha Declaration
101
was intended to promote access to essential medications.
Essential medications, they argue, are those meant to treat
diseases specifically listed in the Doha Declaration, those that
102
were contagious and spreading. Were this definition adopted,
many of the generic drugs produced by India would probably be
produced in violation of TRIPS. Applying this definition
specifically, there is a strong case to be made that hypertension
is not the type of communicable disease that falls under Doha
protection. Hypertension, while perhaps genetic, is not able to
103
ravage a country in the way AIDS or malaria have. This first
subsection of India’s argument demonstrates a conflict over the
scope and applicability of TRIPS to given medications. Without
a resolution, further enforcement measures could be taken by
patent holders, leading to more litigation.
India further reaffirms its claim to produce medication by
citing Article 31, in conjunction with the General Counsel
104
decision. Here India argues that international exceptions to
98. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001).
99. MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus/
public%20health (June 11, 2010).
100. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 6.
101. Subhan, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 60, ¶ 4.
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TRIPS allow for the production of generic medication. Article
31 provides several exceptions for when patents can be
106
infringed upon. Most prominent among these is the national
emergency exception, which permits a country to produce
generic medication in violation of TRIPS if such production is to
107
deal with a public health emergency. Each country is allowed
to decide what determines such an emergency; there is no
108
international standard. India reinforces this with the General
Council decision, declaring that it can use compulsory licensing
to produce medications for developing countries that have an
109
inability to produce such medication. This essentially allows
India to produce any medication without payment to the patent
holder for any country that declares a public health emergency
(under Article 31b) and claims a need for the medication. Such
a conclusion greatly expands India’s right of production under
TRIPS and the Doha Declaration.
Some critics have argued that such a conclusion is against
the collective interest of LDCs and alternative policies such as
public funding of medical therapies, international aid, or price
discrimination by patent holders should instead be
110
considered. Furthermore, the E.U. may argue that the Doha
Declaration does not waive these obligations; indeed, the
General Council Decision specifically holds that only Article 31f
111
is waived under Doha. The E.U. could also argue that there is
little penalty for countries declaring public health emergencies
112
without good cause and that such conduct must be curtailed.
However, the Doha Declaration makes compulsory
licensing a much more feasible tool for developing nations,
113
provided they possess the adequate manufacturing capacity.
105. Additionally, India raised complaints over Articles 41 and 42. Id. ¶ 5.
106. See TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 31(b).
107. Id. This Article holds that use without “reasonable commercial terms
and conditions” with the right holder should be taken only in cases of “national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
108. See id. (allowing countries to use patents without authorization in
cases of emergency, but providing no definition of when an emergency exists).
109. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 2.
110. See Sykes, supra note 37, at 66–67 (discussing alternatives to the
current right of production predicated on national emergency).
111. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 2. As discussed earlier,
Article 31f requires compulsory licensing for domestic use only.
112. For support of such an idea, see Sykes, supra note 37, at 66 (arguing
that the costs of declaring public health emergencies are often externalized, so
there is little incentive not to declare them).
113. See id. at 55 (arguing that Doha allows for compulsory licensing to be
used more effectively for developing nations to achieve their goals, mainly
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Combined with TRIPs, which, under Article 31, requires only
payment of “adequate remuneration” for compulsory licensing
114
if the importing country has declared a national emergency,
the benefits of compulsory licensing far outweigh the
consequences. Countries such as India would be able to benefit
individually from such measures, while externalizing most of
115
the costs of lost research incentives to the collective world.
B. DO WTO PRECEDENTS CLARIFY THE AMBIGUITY OVER
GENERIC MEDICATION PRODUCTION?
A look at WTO case law reaffirms this ambiguity over the
manner in which generic medications are protected under
TRIPS. Only one TRIPS case has ever reached the litigation
116
stage, a case between China and the United States. In this
dispute, the United States brought a complaint claiming that
China had failed to create and enforce domestic measures to
117
prevent counterfeiting (not of generic medications). The WTO
panel was the first to address the enforcement obligations of
118
TRIPS.
The WTO panel, however, only reinforced the idea
119
that TRIPS can and should be applied flexibly.” The WTO
panel found that TRIPS was meant to be applied differently
120
depending on the industry being covered. Scholars found that
lower prices).
114. Such remuneration may be minimal. Id. at 66.
115. The costs externalized to collective nations center primarily around
the loss of valuable research incentives. Sykes, however, argues that because
individual countries make up such a small fraction of the market, their
decision to infringe on patents results in little loss of research incentive and
thus an individual country will see no harm in engaging in compulsory
licensing. However, if all developing countries behave this way there will be
little incentive to research medications for diseases found in developing
countries. This creates a collective action problem Id. at 65–66.
116. Patricia Judd, Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 613, 616
(2011). The United States argued that China had violated Article 61 of the
TRIPS agreement.
117. Id. The case concerned the piracy of digital music files and other
electronic media.
118. Id.
119. See Report of the Panel, China–Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶¶ 7.605, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26,
2009) (citing Report of the Panel, United States–Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, ¶¶ 6.113, 6.178, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (finding that the
panel should consider market-specific conditions when determining whether a
violation of TRIPS has occurred.
120. Id. See also Judd, supra note 116, at 617 (finding that the WTO
“piracy" in China may affect the market differently than piracy in Germany
and that one must assess piracy of books differently than peer-to-peer trading
of digital music files.”)
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the WTO panel only reinforces the fact that TRIPS should be
applied differently based upon the product in question and
121
which country is developing the product. This should be seen
as a positive sign for generic medication producers because it
could be seen as an indicator that the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Mechanism will interpret TRIPS in a lenient
manner in public health circumstances. Case law thus fails to
provide an answer to what specific medications can be produced
under the auspice of TRIPS. Indeed, if anything, the WTO
panel decision only adds to the ambiguity and need for
guidance. At the very least, the WTO’s decision suggests a
flexible approach, which greatly favors generic medication
producers.
Thus, TRIPS and the Doha Declaration fail to definitively
answer what generic medications may be produced in a manner
122
that fulfills the goals of both TRIPS
and the Doha
123
Declaration. While many scholars agree that TRIPS (and the
124
Doha Declaration) should be interpreted in a flexible manner,
this case demonstrates that there is a need for clarification.
125
Billions of dollars may be at stake in these seizures.
Frequently these seizures end with the confiscation of drugs,
126
which prevents them from reaching their intended patients.
More importantly, there is a human element to consider. Drug
seizures could delay the arrival of truly essential medicine to
many developing countries. More guidance from the WTO
would allow for the more efficient transportation of medicines,
121. Id.
122. See Overview, supra note 1 (discussing passage of TRIPS).
123. See World Health, supra note 18.
124. See Judd, supra note 116, at 617 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit All? Making the WTO
Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in Incentives for Global Public Health:
Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines 51, 53 (Thomas Pogge,
Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstien eds., 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443248; Peter K. Yu, The
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 981
(2009)).
125. See Nageshwar Patnaik, India Tops Exporting Generic Medications,
ECONOMIC
TIMES,
Mar.
7,
2010,
THE
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-0307/news/28443868_1_generic-medicines-india-tops-pharmaceutical-industry
(finding that India exports over $8 billion a year in generic medications).
126. See Jennifer M. Freedman, India, Brazil Complain at WTO Over
Generic Drug Seizures by European Union, BLOOMBERG, MAY 12, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-12/india-brazil-complain-at-wto-over(“EU
permits
customs
generic-drug-seizures-by-european-union.html
authorities to confiscate goods in transshipment. . . .”)
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saving time and money.
C. THE INDIAN AND E.U. SETTLEMENT FAILS TO DETERMINE
WHAT GENERIC MEDICATIONS CAN BE PRODUCED.
Unfortunately, guidance regarding the production of
generic medication did not come from resolution of this case. As
was previously discussed, India and the E.U. were able to reach
a settlement, in which the E.U. made several concessions
regarding enforcement proceedings in exchange for suspension
127
of India’s claim in the WTO.
These concessions answer
important questions regarding TRIPS and will be discussed
later. What is also important, though, is what this settlement
does not cover.
Specifically, the settlement does little to clarify what
128
generic medications are protected under TRIPS. There are
two conclusions that can be drawn from this lack of
clarification. First, one could infer that the E.U. did not
challenge the production of any generic medication because
such production is accepted, provided that it does not violate
the patents of the producing country or destination country.
Support for this claim is found within the statutory language of
Doha, which allows countries the flexibility to determine what
a public health emergency is, allowing them to take broad
129
advantage of generic production.
Further support can be
drawn from the fact that countries are free to implement their
own procedures to gain access to generic medications. Indeed,
because countries have this ability, through rights to
130
implement compulsory licensing and other techniques,
a
conclusion can then be drawn that the TRIPS exceptions
provide countries the freedom to determine what medications
are essential. As such, one could argue there is no need to
determine what drugs are protected under the TRIPS
exceptions.
Such an interpretation, though, assumes that TRIPS was
created to promote access to all medicine. While such an
131
aspiration may now be a goal of many, it clashes with a
127. Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75.
128. See Id. (showing no discussion about whether the drugs produced were
legal under TRIPS and its exceptions).
129. See Doha Declaration, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4–6 (providing countries with
flexibility to declare public health emergencies and to take appropriate
measures to deal with such a crisis).
130. Id.
131. For support of such an interpretation, Bazzle, supra note 54, at 785
(arguing that a country’s definition of public health could allow it to claim the
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number of the ideas that drove the creation of TRIPS. At its
inception, TRIPS only allowed patents to be violated to improve
access to life-saving medications, suggesting that improved
132
access to all medicines was not necessarily intended.
Furthermore, the need to declare a public health emergency in
order to invoke the TRIPS exceptions greatly limits its
133
effectiveness, suggesting a similar conclusion.
However, the E.U. never raised the point that the drugs
were produced in violation of TRIPS; instead, the E.U. focused
solely on the issue of whether the drug seizures themselves
134
were lawful.. Had the case proceeded to a WTO panel, the
E.U. could have raised an interesting argument that would
have allowed the WTO to better define the scope of TRIPS and
the Doha Declaration. Unfortunately, because the settlement
did not cover this issue, the ambiguity within TRIPS
135
remains.
Despite this remaining ambiguity, there are solutions that
could better define the scope of TRIPS protection(s) that should
be considered. First, there could be a definitive listing of what
pharmaceutical products are subject to compulsory licensing
136
under TRIPS. Such a proposal was passed in Canada in 2004.
This list would provide clarity as to what drugs could be seized
but would be difficult to implement. However, many Canadian
observers raised the concern that such a list would greatly limit
137
new drugs that could be subject to compulsory licensing.
Furthermore, an attempt to make an exhaustive list would be
difficult, given there are constant innovations and
developments in medications. Indeed, this list would require
constant update and enforcement would be an issue.
authority to manufacture all forms of medication).
132. Hildpold, supra note 36, at 362. Many human rights activists made
this criticism.
133. Id.
134. See Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75. The press release
discussed the claims made by India and how they were being addressed. No
mention was made of an EU claim regarding the right of India to produce the
drug in question.
135. As discussed previously, the EU may have been quick to settle to
protect its own lucrative interests in a free trade agreement. EU-India Settle
WTO Drug Trade Dispute, supra note 63.
136. Richard Elliott, Doha para 6 Implementation: EU proposal vs.
(Nov.
1,
2004,
1:30
PM),
Canadian
legislation,
IP-HEALTH
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2004-November/007091.html. d.
137. Id. Many observers felt that the pharmaceutical industry would
always lobby against the inclusion of more drugs to generic production. Such a
limit would then run contrary to the goal of TRIPS, read together with Doha
and the General Council decision.
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Inconsistencies would lead back to the same issue currently
facing countries. For example, the European Union could claim
a drug for hypertension was subject to TRIPS protections.
Canada, though, could decide that same drug was not subject to
TRIPS protections. India could claim permission from Canada
to manufacture the drug. But, if India ships the drug through
E.U. waters, the drug could still be seized, despite India
claiming the authority to manufacture the drug from Canada.
As a result, such a list would have to come from the WTO or
through multilateral negotiation between countries to ensure
agreement on what drugs could seized in transit. Such
multilateral negotiations would undoubtedly be timeconsuming. Overall, such a solution would be too cumbersome
to properly address the rapidly evolving field.
A second potential solution, proposed in the E.U., would be
138
to define what “essential medication” means under TRIPS.
This would categorize drugs into essential and non-essential.
One expert has proposed that criteria for determining when a
drug is essential include “availability of alternative treatment,
severity of the disease the medication is aimed at treating, and
the capacity of the patent-holder to adequately supply markets
139
that demand the patented product.” This distinction would
allow different patent protection for essential and non-essential
140
drugs.
Such a proposal would solidify TRIPS without
sacrificing the flexibility needed to produce generic drugs to
meet public health emergencies. Generic drug producers could
meet the demand caused by such diseases as AIDS, malaria,
and tuberculosis while still respecting most of the
pharmaceutical industry’s patents. Such a proposal still has its
flaws. After all, the criteria proposed above is still subject to
interpretation and would limit availability of many medications
to developing countries. In addition, this proposal gives more
power to patent holders. If patent holders assert they can
adequately supply the market, than it appears generic
production may be outlawed. Such a meaning would clash with
the idea behind the Doha Declaration, which sought to ensure a
141
greater supply of medication to all countries.
Nevertheless, this solution is still preferable, albeit with
some minor tweaks; for instance, focusing more on the severity
of the disease versus the capacity of the patent holder. Such a
138.
139.
140.
141.

Subhan, supra note 96, at 156.
Id.
Id.
World Health, supra note 18.
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tweak ensures that if the disease is serious enough, generic
production can take place without waiting for patent holders to
decide if they can adequately meet demand. This criteria would
then ensure that patent holders produce cheaply to meet
demand for the severe disease or sacrifice the market to generic
producers. Additionally, this solution better addresses the
flexibility that comes with breakthroughs in medical research.
Rather than amending a list every time a new drug is created,
which could lead to domestic political battles over what drugs
should be added, a new drug can be judged immediately by
preset criteria. Such a definition could be proposed and
implemented through a General Council decision, similar to the
way in which generic exportation was permitted.
Thus, analysis of the first ambiguity shows that little has
changed as a result of the recent drug seizure cases. Solutions
are still required. There needs to be a firmer definition of what
medications are covered and a stronger process for
remuneration, when needed. Such a solution would solidify
international patent protection, aiding manufacturers and
developing countries alike. We now turn to the study of how the
seizures impacted enforcement proceedings under TRIPS.
D. DOES THE TRIPS AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR THE STOP AND
SEIZURE OF GENERIC MEDICATIONS?
While the primary concern of the E.U. was the broad,
aggressive interpretation of the TRIPS exceptions in producing
generic medication, the principal concern of Brazil and India
was the repeated seizures of generic medication. These seizures
delayed shipments of medications for months at a time and, in
142
some cases, resulted in the confiscation of the drugs. Again,
an analysis of TRIPS provides little guidance as to whether the
E.U. was acting within their legal authority in stopping and
seizing medications. Nevertheless, such an analysis is
important because it demonstrates how TRIPS was in part
responsible for the ship seizure controversy.
There are two issues at play. First, did the E.U. adequately
provide notice of their enforcement procedures as required by
the GATT? Second, does the seizure of such generic
medications violate the principles of free transit found within
the GATT and TRIPS? The relevant articles in regards to
enforcement regulations, as discussed previously, are the
following: Article X of the GATT and Articles 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
142. See Freedman, supra note 126.
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143

55, 58, and 59 of TRIPS.
India and Brazil first claimed the E.U. failed to publish
information regarding their trade practices, in violation of
144
Article X of the GATT. India argued that the E.U. violated
Article X because it failed to provide specific information about
145
the rationale of the seizures. Article X provides that “[l]aws,
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of
general application . . . shall be published promptly in such a
manner as to enable governments and traders to become
146
acquainted with them.” Here, India argued that even if the
E.U. is able to justify its seizures, such seizures are still illegal
because the E.U. failed to provide notice of such procedures to
147
India, as required by Article X of the GATT.
The E.U., though, could make a fairly strong defense to
this claim by arguing that European Commission regulations
gave adequate notice as required under Article X of the GATT
and TRIPS. The E.U. ambassador claimed that European
Commission regulations created the right to regulate and
inspect all shipments to ensure they complied with domestic
148
patent regulations. Such regulations, they could then argue,
gave adequate notice to countries that shipments passing
through E.U. territory were subject to regulations that may
lead to temporary seizure. Specifically, the E.U. can point to
149
Regulation 1383/2003, which allows for patent holders to file
150
complaints with customs authorities. After such a complaint,
E.U. officials may seize the product for three days to determine
151
whether the product is in violation of E.U. law. Furthermore,
1383/2003 points to established E.U. regulations on the
152
relevant customs process.
Such detail should satisfy the
requirement that such regulations be published for the benefit
153
of other countries.
143. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 5; Request for
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59.
144. Compare Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2, and
Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4, with GATT, supra
note 61, art. X ¶ 1.
145. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
146. GATT, supra note 61, art. X ¶ 1.
147. Compare Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2, with
GATT, supra note 61, art. X ¶ 2.
148. See Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, supra note 70.
149. Council Regulation 1383/2003, art. 4(1), 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 (EC).
150. Id. art. 5(1).
151. Id. art. 4(1).
152. See id. art. 1.
153. See generally Commission Regulation 1891/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 328) 16

406

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 21:2

Brazil and India claimed that these regulations go beyond
the authority prescribed for the E.U. in TRIPS and the Doha
154
Declaration. Specifically, Brazil and India argued that the
E.U. actions were in violation of Articles V of the GATT, and 41
155
and 42 of TRIPS. Additionally, Articles 50 through 55 are
156
also cited by Brazil. India and Brazil use these Articles to
argue that the seizures were in violation of international law
157
because they impaired the free transit of goods.
India and Brazil both based a strong part of this claim on
158
Article V of the GATT. India specifically alleged that the E.U.
159
violated this Article because the goods were merely in transit.
The statutory language of Article V(1) defines goods in transit
as:
Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of
transport, shall be deemed to be in transit across the territory of a
contracting party when the passage across such territory, with or
without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in
the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey
beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting
160
party across whose territory the traffic passes.

The shipments of generic medication were never bound for
161
the E.U. but for countries in Latin America and Africa. Given
that the goods were never to stop in E.U. jurisdiction, Article V
protections should apply, preventing outside countries from

(EC) (providing the provisions that allow for customs action to be taken
against goods suspected to be in violation of domestic patent laws). These
regulations are found on-line and easy to access.
154. See generally Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59,
(arguing the these provisions were inconsistent with the GATT and TRIPS)
155. Id. ¶¶ 1,4; Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4.
156. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4.
157. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 5; Request for
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 2.
158. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 1; Request for
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4. Brazil also alleged the EU to be
in violation of Article XVI of the WTO, which requires notification of
contracting parties of any subsidies. Id. at 4; GATT, supra note 61, art. XVI.
This Article was not the focal point of the litigation and will not be analyzed.
See Swaraj Paul Barooah, India, Brazil Start Dispute Proceedings Against EU,
IP
(May
18,
2010,
2:50
PM),
SPICY
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/05/india-brazil-start-disputeproceedings.html. (claiming that the strongest arguments for India and Brazil
came from within TRIPS and Article V of the GATT).
159. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 1.
160. GATT, supra note 61, art. V ¶ 1.
161. Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, supra note 68.
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162

interference. However, Subsection 3 may provide a basis for
163
E.U. defense. This section allows for reasonable delay so that
goods may be entered and inspected to ensure compliance with
domestic customs laws and procedures, provided that any delay
164
is minimal. E.U. officials argued that the cargo was only
being checked to ensure that it was not to be diverted into E.U.
165
ports. However, given that no countries in the E.U. were a
destination for the medication, such intrusive delay seems to go
beyond the scope of ‘minimum delay.’ Rather, the E.U. should
have limited its customs procedures to ensure the drugs stayed
in transit, which would not require their seizure.
Brazil further argued that the E.U. did not meet the
166
standard set forth in Article 52. As one commentator points
167
out, Article 52 requires that in order for seizure to take place
“under the laws of the country of importation, there is prima
facie an infringement of the right holder’s intellectual property
right and to supply a sufficiently detailed description of the
goods to make them readily recognizable by the customs
168
authorities.”
Essentially, there must be a risk that the
169
medicine being seized will be availed to the domestic market.
The problem is this standard was difficult to interpret and
apply.
The first relevant article in applying this standard is
Article 50. This article gives nations the authority to regulate
and inspect all shipments under provisional measures to
ensure they are in compliance with TRIPS and the Doha
170
Declaration. Such measures are intended to give Members of
171
the WTO the ability to regulate patented goods.
These
provisional measures provide countries the authority to enforce
their domestic laws, specifically “to prevent an infringement of
any intellectual property right from occurring, and in
162. Id.
163. See GATT, supra note 61, art. V.
164. Id.
165. See Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, supra note 70.
166. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4.
167. Catherine Dounis, Note, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights via EU
Border Regulations: Inhibiting Access to Medicine or Preventing Counterfeit
Medicine, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 717, 748–49 (2011).
168. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 52.
169. Dounis, supra note 167, at 748.
170. See generally TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 50. Here, Dutch customs
officials, upon inspection, found a generic version of Cozaar, an antihypertensive drug produced by Merck. This discovery led to the subsequent
seizure. See Stirrup & Hebditch, supra note 93.
171. Overview, supra note 1.
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particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce
in their jurisdiction of goods, including imported goods
immediately after customs clearance” and to “to preserve
172
relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.”
The E.U. Ambassador Guth affirmed
the E.U.’s right to
173
seize the goods by citing Article 51, which states:
Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below, adopt
procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for
suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated
copyright goods may take place, to lodge an application in writing
with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for the
suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free
174
circulation of such goods.

Ambassador Guth argued that Article 51 gave it the authority
to implement a customs system that allowed for temporary
175
suspension of cargo.
In this instance, Ambassador Guth
argued that the presence of generic medications in a
Netherlands port was enough to justify a temporary seizure of
176
cargo. Specifically, Ambassador Guth argued that its seizure
was necessary to ensure the drugs were not being brought into
the Netherlands or other countries, undermining domestic
177
patent protection.
One can again see the problems caused by the ambiguity
found within these agreements. The E.U. can argue that
seizing the cargo did not amount to a violation of the GATT,
because the cargo was stopped only to ensure compliance with
domestic customs procedures. At the same time, India and
Brazil can make the argument that the drugs should not have
been seized because they were never meant to end up in E.U.
markets. The clash between these two arguments immediately
raises questions over the Articles’ interpretation. The issue is
whether European Commission regulations may apply to goods
that merely pass through (Article V, goods-in-transit) or
whether it may only apply to goods which are being exported to
E.U. members.
Given these ambiguities, there was hope that settlement
would provide greater guidance to this element of TRIPS.
172. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 50(a)–50(b).
173. See Guth, supra note 68.
174. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 51.
175. See Guth, supra note 68.
176. See Stirrup & Hebditch, supra note 93 (“. . . Dutch officials deemed the
“storage” of the patented drug on Dutch soil to be infringement of the Dutch
patent.”). See also Guth, supra note 68 (“. . . Duth authorities temporarily
detained . . . a small shipment of drugs . . . in order to control it.”)
177. See Guth, supra note 68.
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Again, we turn to the resolution reached between India and the
E.U. to understand what lessons can be applied in further
TRIPS interpretation.
E. THE INDIAN AND E.U. SETTLEMENT PROVIDES GUIDANCE AS
TO WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTABLE ENFORCEMENT.
Despite the lack of resolution on the issue of essential
medications, the E.U.-India settlement made substantial
progress in settling the issue of customs enforcement. India, as
previously discussed, agreed to suspend its suit against the
E.U. in exchange for amendments to E.U. customs regulations
and seizure protocols. The specifics of the E.U. reforms are still
in progress, but it seems that any potential reform will include
the following proposals. First, the E.U. will no longer be able to
178
seize medications on the basis of an E.U. patent alone.
Second, the European Commission will revise Regulation
179
1383/2003, which was the initial basis for the seizure. The
specifics to the overhaul of this regulation have not yet been
made clear, but preliminary statements suggest the E.U. will
be required to demonstrate that the seized drugs were intended
180
to be sold within E.U. markets. Finally, it will likely require
that, upon seizure, some proof of evidence must be provided to
the shipping company as to the rationale for the seizure of the
181
drugs. The settlement terms greatly favor India and deal
primarily with the customs procedures of E.U. territories. A
comparison of the proposed reforms with the previous terms
demonstrates several important changes made to the E.U.’s
understanding of enforcement proceedings under TRIPS.
Under the new settlement terms, the E.U. will have a
much higher standard to reach in order to justify the seizure of
medications. Prior to this agreement, E.U. officials had seized
many drugs on the basis that their sale within E.U. borders

178. Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75.
179. Id. The original regulation gave broad powers to customs officials in
suspending the transit of goods, giving them the authority to suspend goods
“for the period necessary to determine whether suspect goods are indeed
counterfeit goods, pirated goods or goods infringing certain intellectual
property rights.” Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003, ¶ 5, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7.
180. Phil Taylor, Dispute over EU Drug Seizure Nears Resolution,
SECURING PHARMA (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.securingpharma.com/disputeover-eu-generic-drug-seizures-nears-resolution/s40/a1004/.
181. Id. India had frequently complained that the EU would seize goods
with no explanation, as was required under the TRIPS agreement. India,
Brazil raise dispute over EU drug seizures, supra note 44.
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182

would constitute a violation of E.U. laws.
India always
objected, claiming that such goods were merely in transit
through E.U. ports and were intended to be sold in other
183
countries, which would not be a violation of E.U. law. Under
the terms of the settlement, the E.U. has agreed to seize
materials only in cases where “there is adequate evidence that
satisfies the customs authorities that there is a substantial
likelihood of diversion of such medicines on to the E.U.
184
market.” In doing so, the E.U. has increased its standard of
seizure, having to provide substantial evidence that shows any
shipment of generic medicine is meant to be sold within E.U.
185
territory.
This heightened standard will be implemented through the
186
proposed reforms to European Commission regulations. The
proposed reforms will provide important answers about the
extent of which countries can take action to protect markets.
Initially, European Regulation 1383/2003 was interpreted to
allow the seizure of any drug that made its way through
187
European territory. As has been discussed before, India and
Brazil had held that such interpretations violated the GATT
188
The E.U.’s change of
Articles of free trade and transit.
standard clarifies an important ambiguity of TRIPS
enforcement. Patent protection enforcement must now be solely
for the protection of domestic markets. No longer can seizures
be made to effectively protect the violation of a domestic patent
overseas. Such an interpretation is beneficial because it
promotes free transit of goods. In addition, a pharmaceutical
producer’s complaint can no longer be the basis for the seizure
of medication. Such an interpretation would promote an
important principle in international trade; countries should
respect the flow of transit over the domestic protection of goods.
Such a solution appears to make sense. As one
commentator points out, the previous E.U. interpretation of
TRIPS made “goods illegal that were legitimate in their country
189
of origin and destination country.” This same commentator
182. See Taylor, supra note 180.
183. India, Brazil raise dispute over EU drug seizures, supra note 44.
184. Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75.
185. See Taylor, supra note 180.
186. See Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75.
187. See Taylor, supra note 180.
188. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 5; Request for
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59.
189. Dounis, supra note, 167, at 748. Essentially, a good produced in India,
bound for Brazil, legal in both countries, could be seized because a different
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expressed concerns that previous interpretations of TRIPS
would force countries to redirect trading routes in order to
190
avoid countries with strict TRIPS enforcement protocol. Such
a process would have been greatly inconvenient and
191
inefficient. The proposed reforms, as they stand, will ensure
that such efficiency will not be sacrificed in the name of patent
protection. Furthermore, it reinforces the independence that
192
the TRIPS exceptions were created to protect.
After all,
TRIPS, when read together with the Doha Declaration and the
General Council Decision, was designed to ensure that
countries maintained their autonomy in developing their own
193
patent protection and enforcement procedures. By ensuring
that goods are free to move, provided they are legal in both the
host country and destination country, the reforms ensure that
countries can set their own patent agendas without the fear of
another country’s agenda interfering. As a result, the proposed
changes likely ensure that future seizures will be more
carefully made, as countries will now be expected to
immediately provide an explanation for their actions. Previous
seizures required less evidence and made countries more apt to
194
seize drugs. Because of this change, countries will be more
cautious in enforcement, as they will be expected to
immediately turn evidence over. This raises the standard to
seize generic medications (or any good produced under the
auspice of TRIPS). And these heightened standards ensure that
195
such drug seizures will decrease in frequency.
These settlement provisions, as discussed above, would
nation deemed it illegal.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See Overview, supra note 1.
193. Such autonomy would allow developing countries to maintain access
to needed medications. Id.
194. See Taylor, supra note 180 (arguing that previous standards for
seizure were so low they allowed for frequent search and seizure).
195. One interesting point remaining from the settlement is the lack of
resolution between Brazil and the EU. See EU-India Settle WTO Drug Trade
Dispute, supra note 63. Perhaps the most prominent reason for this is the fact
that Brazil has been more aggressive in its use of compulsory licensing under
the auspice of the TRIPS agreement. See Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing
Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (2009); see also Harris, supra
note 57, at 387 (discussing Brazil’s use of compulsory licensing). Thus, Brazil
may be looking to more strongly assert their rights to generic production.
Additionally, Brazil, having pursued this more aggressively, without a freetrade agreement at stake, may be demanding some sort of reparation. This
litigation will be interesting to follow, as it may answer more questions about
the production of generic medications.
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provide much-needed consistency to international patent
enforcement regimes and should be adopted worldwide. While
the India settlement deals only with E.U. provisions, the WTO
should ensure other countries consider their adoption;
alternatively, the WTO could consider amending TRIPS
through a General Council decision to at least promote their
serious consideration.
However, this type of WTO action would be contrary to a
premise behind TRIPS, which was designed to allow nations to
196
enact more stringent patent protections if they so chose.
Perhaps pressure from this suit will signal to other countries
the standards needed to stop and seize drugs. However
subsequent WTO panels will need to adopt standards similar to
those conceded by the E.U. in its settlement. This will force
countries to reevaluate their domestic procedures to meet the
standards found in this settlement. This is a slow process and
requires further suits to be filed against other offending
countries, should seizures occur in the future. Short of outright
renegotiation of TRIPS, this is the best way to ensure the
settlement standards are applied worldwide.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent drug seizures by the E.U. have been costly both
in terms of money and health, and perhaps have reduced access
to some medications. Such seizures have demonstrated the
problematic ambiguities of TRIPS. Despite being created to
enforce international patent laws while still protecting public
health, the uncertainty of TRIPS has led to inconsistent
interpretations, and costly domestic seizures of goods in transit.
An analysis of the seizures shows that TRIPS is inherently
uncertain about what type of medications can be produced and
how countries may enforce domestic patent laws.
The recent settlement of the Request for Consultations
Regarding Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit helps to solve
one ambiguity of TRIPS and its exceptions while leaving the
other open. The settlement does little to answer the question of
what medicines can be produced under TRIPS but
demonstrates that free transit of goods should be of the upmost
importance. Thus, going forward, E.U. seizures will likely
cease, but there will still be important questions to answer
regarding the scope of TRIPS in the production of generic
medication. As discussed above, such questions can be
196. See Overview, supra note 1.
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answered through the creation of a list of drugs that can be
generically produced under TRIPS, or alternatively, through a
more clear definition of the types of drugs TRIPS was meant to
cover. The latter proposal is the best solution, as it allows
TRIPS to stay relevant to new medications and can better be
enforced through the WTO.
Nevertheless, this controversy helped to resolve one
important ambiguity found within TRIPS. By ensuring stricter
standards for the stop and seizure of medications, this
settlement’s emphasis on free transit ensures that countries
can no longer seize drugs without credible evidence that their
own domestic supply is being affected. If the WTO can adopt
such standards in its subsequent decisions interpreting TRIPS,
this settlement will have helped to ensure greater protection
for the free transit of generic medications. Importantly, free
transit will continue to ensure a steady flow of medications for
lesser-developed countries in need.

